Wednesday, May 6, 2020

COIN Compaigns Vietnam and Afghanistan - 1321 Words

COIN Campaigns: Vietnam and Afghanistan United States (U.S.) doctrine focuses its COIN methods on the ability to assist a host nation in building political legitimacy and creditability. Establishing political legitimacy is the foundation of COIN strategy enabling governments to create rapport with local leaders and gain the support of its communities while simultaneously eliminating an insurgency. Doctrine is subjective rather than prescriptive; however, failure to adhere to fundamental principles causes a good deal of contradiction on how to accomplish specific goals. Evidence provided in the COIN campaigns conducted in both Vietnam and Afghanistan showed flawed implementation of basic U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. That doctrine includes the ability to establish a valid political strategy, securing the populace all with a host nation in the lead effort. While these two wars have many differences, they are similar in ways. Specifically, how the U.S. failed to follow basic practices of COIN, and how leveraging less ons learned are paramount to U.S. strategic initiatives. Political Strategy A premise of COIN doctrine calls for a long-term political strategy implementing legitimacy in government instilling effectiveness in the eyes of the governed. How can one build a successful COIN campaign by supporting weak surrogate leadership as the U.S. did in both Vietnam and Afghanistan? Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam and Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan are both examples of failed

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